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The Japanese economy has suffered from persistent deflation since the 
mid-1990s, when the banking system fell into serious undercapitalization. In 
Germany and in China, worries about impending deflation have emerged, 
along with fear of prospective or hidden bank insolvency.   
  In this paper I present a simple model in which bank insolvency causes 
deflation. During a period of bank insolvency, bank deposits in excess of bank 
assets continue to exist if the government (implicitly) guarantees them. I 
assume that bank deposits cannot exceed a certain multiple of the monetary 
base and that the government is prohibited to expand fiscal expenditures. A 
government that guarantees unbacked bank deposits without recapitalizing 
an insolvent banking system is forced to set the nominal interest rate at 
nearly zero and to let the price level fall. 
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Japan has suﬀered from persistent deﬂation and has kept the short-term nominal rate
of interest at zero since the mid-1990s, when the banking system fell into serious un-
dercapitalization. The persistent deﬂation and low nominal interest rates in Japan have
triggered a debate in macroeconomics about monetary policy in a deﬂationary environ-
ment. In this academic and policy debate, deﬂation and low nominal interest rates are
assumed to be caused by exogenous shocks on productivity or preference.1 There does
not seem to be any research pointing to a possible linkage between Japan’s deﬂation and
its ﬁnancial system disarray subsequent to the collapse of its asset-price bubble at the
beginning of the 1990s. In point of fact, it was precisely when the fear of an impending
banking crisis emerged in the mid-1990s that deﬂation in Japan set in.
In Germany, worry of impending deﬂation emerged in 2003, just when the vulnera-
bility of its ﬁnancial system surfaced. In China, where the scale of the nonperforming
loan problem is alleged to be larger than Japan’s, the prices of goods are falling whereas
the prices of services are rising. The examples of Japan, Germany, and China seem to
indicate the possibility of a linkage between banking system problems and deﬂation.2
The unique characteristic of Japan’s banking problem is the lengthy postponement of
action to bail banks out. The Japanese government moved quickly to guarantee all bank
deposits, but it did not come up with measures to restore the solvency of the banking
system until several years had passed after bank insolvency had become apparent. My
conjecture is that the postponed recapitalization of an insolvent banking system may
have had a causal link with the protracted deﬂation.
The purpose of this note is to show a theoretical possibility that systemic bank in-
solvency can cause deﬂation if the government makes use of a forbearance policy: guar-
anteeing bank deposit without bailing out an insolvent banking system directly through
1Papers in this literature include, for example, Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), and Svensson (2003).
2In the literature of banking crises, it has recently been found that the inﬂation rate typically falls
after the onset of bank insolvency in single-crisis countries (Boyd et al. [2001]).
2an injection of taxpayers’ money. During a period of bank insolvency, bank deposits
in excess of bank assets continue to exist under this forbearance policy. Assuming that
the banks need to hold liquid assets to produce transaction services associated with the
deposits, the growth of unbacked deposits forces banks to increase their holdings of liquid
assets and to decrease loans to ﬁrms, where the loans are proportional to the price level.
This mechanism reduces the ratio of bank loans to cash, and induces deﬂation.
If deﬂation is caused by bank insolvency and the government’s forbearance, the
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r dp o l i c yt os t o pd e ﬂation would be to bail out the insolvent banks through
a one time lump-sum transfer from the consumers to them. Monetary policy (i.e., swap-
ping cash for government bonds) alone will not be eﬀective in halting deﬂation, since
the increase of cash by means of this policy will decrease the outstanding amount of
government bonds, resulting in a decrease in necessary tax revenue. If real activity does
not change, the decrease in tax revenue implies a decrease in the price level. Therefore,
monetary policy can be eﬀective in stopping deﬂation only if ﬁscal expansion accompa-
nies it. But in this case, the government debt will violate the transversality condition.
In short, to cope with deﬂation without resolving bank insolvency is a very diﬃcult task
for policymakers to tackle.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In the next section, I present the basic
structure of the model. In Section 3, I introduce bank insolvency caused by an unexpected
macroeconomic shock, and I describe the development of deﬂa t i o ni na ne n v i r o n m e n t
of deposit guarantees and postponed bank recapitalization. Section 4 provides some
concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The structure of the model is similar to that in Kobayashi (2003), with a few essential
diﬀerences: I introduce cash in a version of the previous model and simplify the produc-
tion technology such that the output is equal to the endowment at each date, and there
is no capital accumulation.
The economy continues for an inﬁnite period from date 0: t =0 ,1,2,···,+∞.T h i s
3economy consists of one government and continua of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks. Each
continuum (of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks) is of measure 1. I assume that consumers,
ﬁrms, and banks act as price takers as a result of competition in each sector. I also make
the following assumption about the medium of exchange in this economy:
Assumption 1 Money consists of cash, bank deposits, or government bonds. All trans-
actions between a consumer and a ﬁrm must be mediated by money. A consumer and a
ﬁr mc a n n o td i r e c t l yl e n dt oo rb o r r o wf r o me a c ho t h e r .
Cash is intrinsically useless paper provided by the government.
Government The government issues bonds (Bt)a n dc a s h( Mt), collects revenue from
a consumption tax (τtPtct), and makes a lump-sum transfer to consumers (Gt), satisfying
the following budget constraint:
B0 + M0 = B + M + G0,
τtPtct = Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Gt − Bt − Mt, for t ≥ 1,
(1)
where B and M are the initial amount of government bonds and cash owned by con-
sumers, Pt i st h ep r i c eo ft h ec o n s u m e rg o o d s ,ct is the consumption at date t,a n dRt is
the nominal return between date t and date t +1 .
Consumers The consumers are inﬁnitely long-lived and maximize the following utility:
P∞
t=1 βtu(ct), where ct is consumption at date t, β is the discount factor, and u(c)i sa
concave and increasing function of c. I assume for simplicity that u(c)=l n c.E a c h
consumer is endowed with one unit of labor at each date t. At each date t,c o n s u m e r s
sell their labor to ﬁrms, buy consumer goods from ﬁrms, and consume them at the same








    
    
B0 + D0 ≤ B + M + W0n0 + G0,
(1 + τt)Ptct + Bt + Dt ≤ Rt−1(Bt−1 + Dt−1)+Wtnt + ΠF
t + Gt, for t ≥ 1,
0 ≤ nt ≤ 1, for ∀t,
(2)
4where B and M are the initial amounts of government bonds and cash owned by con-
sumers, Dt is bank deposits at date t, Rt is the nominal return on bank deposits and
government bonds, nt is the labor supply, Wt is the wage, and ΠF
t is the dividend from
ﬁrms.
Note that consumers deposit all cash Mt provided by the government in banks, since
the deposit rate Rt is no less than one. The arbitrage between bonds and deposits
guarantees that the nominal returns on government bonds and on bank deposits are
equal: Arbitrage occurs because they are perfectly equivalent assets for consumers (see
Assumption 1). Note also that wage income Wtnt and dividend ΠF
t are given in the form
of bank deposits (see below).
Firms and banks Firms continue operating for one period. Firms are established at
date t, they produce output at date t+1 ,s e l lt h eo u t p u t ,p a yo u tt h ed i v i d e n d s( i fa n y )
to consumers, and are liquidated at date t+1. I assume a simple production technology:
one unit of labor at date t is transformed into one unit of consumer goods at date t+1.
Since Assumption 1 holds, a ﬁrm needs to have money (cash or bank deposits) to buy
labor from consumers. Since it does not have money, it must borrow from banks. Given















where Lt is the amount of money that the ﬁrm borrows from a bank, RL
t is the nominal
return on the bank loan, nd
t is the amount of labor employed, and yt+1 is the amount of
consumer goods produced. Note that the bank provides loan Lt for the ﬁrm by giving
the bank deposits Lt.
I assume that banks continue operating indeﬁnitely. Banks accept deposits from
consumers and provide loans to ﬁrms. Here I assume that the amount of deposits that
5a bank can lend is limited by its production technology for transaction services:
Assumption 2 A bank holds cash, government bonds, and loans to ﬁr m sa si t sa s s e t s ,
and deposits as its liabilities. It cannot have any liabilities other than deposits. A bank




Mt, (0 < ρ < 1). (4)
This production technology is a simpliﬁed version of the technology for producing de-
mand deposits in Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995).3 This assumption can be
interpreted as a requirement that a bank must produce transaction services for all its
liabilities. A crucial point is that the government bonds cannot be used as banks’ re-
serves: It is assumed that a bank produces transaction services only from cash, not from
government bonds.












t Lt + RtBB
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where Lt is the amount of bank loans, BB
t is the amount of government bonds held by the
bank, and Dt is the amount of deposits. The third constraint (BB
t ≥ 0) necessitates some
3 The microfoundation of this constraint can be built on the setting introduced by Smith (2002): At
a time between date t and date t + 1, a portion of the depositors (of measure ρ) are forced to move to a
place where they lose communication with their original banks. The ρ depositors must withdraw their
entire deposits Dt, take them in the form of cash to the new location, and deposit them in other banks
there. Thus the banks must provide ρ depositors with cash ρDt at a time between t and t+1. Therefore,
the banks must hold cash Mt ≥ ρDt at date t to fulﬁll the demand deposit contract.
Although I assume that the upper bound of deposit creation is a technological constraint, it can be
interpreted alternatively that the required reserve imposed by the government determines the upper
bound, and that ρ is the rate of required reserves.
6explanation. Since in reality a bank can sell government bonds short, it seems plausible
to assume that a bank can set BB
t at a negative value. And in this model the banks have
strong incentive to set BB
t < 0, because RL
t >R t in the equilibrium as long as Rt > 1
(see equation [9]): The banks can earn inﬁnite proﬁts by selling government bonds short
and increasing loans to ﬁrms. However, Assumption 2 sets a limit on this arbitrage.
Assumption 2 says that the gross liabilities of a bank must be smaller than or equal
to ρ−1Mt.T h u s i f a b a n k s e t s BB
t at a negative value, it must set aside cash reserves
−ρBB
t , since the bank bears liabilities −BB
t when it sells −BB
t units of bonds short: In
this model, selling government bonds short is equivalent for a bank to increasing bank
deposits in the same amounts. Therefore, we can set the constraint BB
t ≥ 0 without loss
of generality.
Constraint on ﬁscal policy I consider the case where the following constraint on
ﬁscal policy is imposed:
τt = τ > 0, and Gt =0 , for ∀t. (6)
In Section 3 (page 12) I discuss the case where the government can choose {Gt}∞
t=0 freely.







Rt =( 1− ρ)RL
t + ρ. (9)
The market-clearing conditions are nd
t =1 ,ct =1 ,a n dWt = Lt.N o t et h a tBB
t =0i n
the equilibrium since RL
t ≥ Rt.4 There exists a competitive equilibrium with constant
inﬂation:
4If Rt = 1, the nominal returns on bank loans and on the government bonds are equal. In this case
banks are indiﬀerent between loans and bonds, but I assume for simplicity that banks choose to provide
l o a n si nt h i sc a s e .





τ. For any value of π g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o
β, there exists a competitive equilibrium with a constant rate of inﬂation:
Pt+1
Pt = π.
(Proof) In an equilibrium with a constant inﬂation rate π, the dynamics of the system are
described by Rt = π




1−ρ , Wt =
(1−ρ)πt+1P0
π
β −ρ , Mt =
ρ
1−ρWt,a n dτπt+1P0 =
π


















Since I prohibit ﬁscal expenditure, the value of Bt must be nonnegative in an equilibrium. Note
that π ≥ β, since the nominal return Rt = π













τ. Therefore, setting P0 at








,w eh a v eBt > 0 for all t<+∞.T h et r a n s v e r s a l i t y











It has been shown that for any π ≥ β there exists a competitive equilibirium with constant
inﬂation π.( E n do fP r o o f )
This lemma says that inﬂation at any given rate can occur as an equilibrium outcome
if the government sets {Bt,M t}∞
t=0 appropriately. In particular, there exists a steady state
equilibrium with a constant price level (i.e., π = 1) in which the government chooses





In this equilibrium, Pt = P∗ ≡
1−ρβ





1−ρ ,a n dWt = Lt =( 1
ρ −1)M.
3 Bank Insolvency and Deﬂation
I assume that at date 0, all agents in the economy expected that the economy would stay
in the steady state equilibrium described above, and that an unexpected macroeconomic
shock hit the economy at date 1 that rendered banks insolvent.
8Bank insolvency At date 1, after ﬁrms sold goods (produced between date 0 and
date 1) to the consumers and before they repaid their bank loans, a macroeconomic
shock λ (0 < λ < 1) hit the economy unexpectedly. I assume that this shock enabled
λ ﬁrms to transfer their revenue (P∗) to their owners (consumers) and to go bankrupt
and default on their bank borrowings. Thus the consumers obtained unexpected proﬁts
λP∗ in the form of bank deposits at date 1, while the banks incurred irrecoverable loans
N1 = λP∗. This shock λ can be interpreted as a model of the emergence and collapse of
the asset-price bubble.5
Forbearance policy At date 1 after cash is paid out to consumers, banks’ only assets
are the irrecoverable loans N1, and their liabilities are the uncleared deposits N1 from
consumers. If the government does not guarantee the uncleared deposits N1,b a n kr u n s
occur and the irrecoverable loans N1 are immediately written oﬀ, while consumers bear
the cost as a lump sum. But, as in Kobayashi (2003), the government does not allow the
occurrence of defaults on bank deposits, since it wants to maintain the public’s conﬁdence
in banks or in deposit money. The government’s guarantee of deposits N1 is an implicit
liability of the government. If the government decides that it is unwilling to let depositors
bear the losses resulting from bank insolvency, it has no other choice than to make up for
the losses itself, ultimately through the use of taxpayers’ money. In what follows, I use the
term bank recapitalization to refer to this form of banking system recapitalization through
the injection of taxpayers’ money. To inject taxpayers’ money into the banking system is
an unpopular policy and politically diﬃcult to implement. The government tries to put
oﬀ recognizing bank insolvency and making up for losses. Thus the government can be
said to have undertaken a forbearance policy: guaranteeing the uncleared deposits N1
and postponing bank recapitalization. I consider a perfect foresight equilibrium where
the government guarantees bank deposits under the following assumption:
5Suppose that consumers own useless assets, e.g., land, the fundamental price of which is zero. An
exogenous boom makes land prices rise, and ﬁrms invest their revenue P
∗ in land expecting a further
rise of prices. Then, the subsequent price collapse makes ﬁrms go bankrupt, leaving the consumers
unexpected proﬁts.
9Assumption 3 The government declares that and people expect that it will recapitalize
the banking sector through a one time lump-sum transfer from consumers to banks at
some date T (where T can be a very large integer), i.e., the government levies a lump-
sum tax on consumers at date T, and gives the tax revenue to the banks at the same
date.
Note that bank recapitalization through a lump-sum transfer does not distort the decision
making of the consumers. Therefore, in the model of this paper the postponement of
bank recapitalization does not have any eﬀects on welfare, while in the model of Deckle
and Kletzer (2003), Barseghyan (2002), and Kobayashi (2003), where recapitalization
through a lump-sum transfer is prohibited, the postponement of recapitalization causes
welfare loss under a distortionary tax system.
Deﬂation under forbearance policy Banks have no other choice than to let the
uncleared deposits N1 evolve at the nominal rate of return Rt, since otherwise depositors
will make a run on banks to withdraw cash and to invest it in government bonds, resulting
in banks’ defaults on deposits.
Therefore, as long as the government postpones bank recapitalization, the uncleared
















       
       
(1 + τ)P1c1 + D1 + B1 ≤ R0(B0 + D0)+W1n1 + N1,
(1 + τ)Ptct + Dt + Bt ≤ Rt−1(Bt−1 + Dt−1)+Wtnt + ΠF
t , for t ≥ 2a n dt 6= T,
(1 + τ)PTcT + DT + BT ≤ RT−1(BT−1 + DT−1)+WTnT + ΠF
T − NT, for date T,
0 ≤ nt ≤ 1, for ∀t.
(13)
10The banks take it for granted that they have the unbacked deposit liabilities Nt
from consumers and the same amount of assets, i.e., the government’s guarantee of the













t Lt + RtBB




       
       
Dt = Lt + BB
t + Nt + Mt for 1 ≤ t<T,
Dt = Lt + BB





The dynamics of the system in which the unbacked deposits Nt are guaranteed are
described by the following system. (Note that BB
















for all t ≥ 1, (17)
τPt+1 = RtBt + Mt − Bt+1 − Mt+1 for all t ≥ 1, (18)
Wt + Nt + Mt =
1
ρ
Mt for 1 ≤ t<T, (19)
Wt + Mt =
1
ρ
Mt for t ≥ T. (20)
I focus the analysis on the equilibrium where the inﬂation rate is constant for t ≤ T − 2
and the price level is stable from date T onward:
Pt+1
Pt = π for 1 ≤ t ≤ T −2a n dPt = P
for t ≥ T.





τ and that the shock λ satisﬁes




Assume also that the government sets the date of bank recapitalization T at a large
number. There exist η(T) and π(T) such that the government must set η(T) ≤ π ≤ π(T)
in order to have a constant inﬂation
Pt+1
Pt = π for t ≤ T −2 and a constant price Pt = P
11for t ≥ T,w h e r eβ ≤ η(T) < π(T) and limT→∞η(T)=l i m T→∞ π(T)=β. Therefore,
if the government sets T at a suﬃciently large number, deﬂa t i o no c c u r sf o rt ≤ T − 2
because π(T) < 1 for a large T, and the nominal interest rate (Rt − 1=π
β − 1) becomes
nearly zero.





τβ B0. The condition W1 + N1 + M1 = 1

















ρ−1. The dynamics of the system for 1 ≤ t ≤ T −1 are described
by Rt = π




1−ρ , Wt =
(1−ρ)πtP ∗
π
β −ρ , Nt = πt−1






and τπtP ∗ = π
βBt + Mt − Bt+1 − Mt+1. The last diﬀerence equation is for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 2. The

























,a n dc =
(1−β)ρ
τβ(1−ρ)λ. The function a(π)i s
decreasing in π and b(π)i si n c r e a s i n gi nπ. In the equilibrium Bt must be nonnegative for all


































It can be shown that f(β,T − 2) = a(β) − c>0f r o m( 2 1 ) ,a n dt h a tl i m π→∞ f(π,T − 2) =
−
(1−ρ)ρβ
(1−ρβ)τ − (T − 2)
(1−β)λρ






for a large T.S i n c e f(π,T − 2)
is a decreasing function of π, π(T) uniquely exists. It is easily shown that β < π(T)a n d
limT→∞ π(T)=β. The necessary condition for BT−1 > 0i st h a tπ ≤ π(T). Therefore, the
government must set π such that
β ≤ π ≤ π(T). (24)
The constant price level, P, after the bank bailout is determined uniquely as follows. Equation
(18) implies
τP = RT−1BT−1 + MT−1 − B − M, (25)
where B and M are the steady state levels of bonds and cash. Lemma 1 implies that in a steady
state equilibrium B =
τβ
1−βP and M =
ρβ
1−ρβP.S i n c eRT−1 = P





















.T h i s
condition can be rewritten as
π ≥ ξ(T), (27)
where ξ(T)i sd e ﬁned by f(ξ(T),T − 2) = βT−1d.B yd e ﬁnition, ξ(T) < π(T). It is also easily
shown that limT→∞ ξ(T)=β. Combining conditions (24) and (27), the necessary condition for
existence of the equilibrium is η(T) ≤ π ≤ π(T), where η(T)=m a x {β,ξ(T)}.
In the equilibrium, it must be the case that P
PT−1 ≥ β; otherwise the nominal interest rate
becomes negative. Equation (19) implies that MT−1 =
ρ























That T is suﬃciently large guarantees that RT−1 ≥ 1 and that there exists an equilibrium. (End
of proof)
Discussion In this model nonperforming loans Nt are equivalent to government debt,
since the government guarantees bank deposits. Therefore, one might expect that an
increase in nonperforming loans would cause an increase in the inﬂation rate, as an
increase in government debt usually does (Sargent and Wallace [1981]). The inﬂationary
eﬀect of nonperforming loans appears in the jump from PT−1 to PT = P. Equation (28)
implies that the inﬂation rate at date T −1 (just before the bank bailout) becomes quite
large if T is large. Nonperforming loans cause deﬂation “temporarily” for t<T− 1,
since banks must hold the assets and corresponding liabilities, Nt, under a technological
constraint on production of transaction services (Assumption 2). But when banks are
recapitalized, nonperforming loans work as government debt and do indeed cause one-
time inﬂation.
The straightforward policy to prevent deﬂation in this model is to recapitalize the
banking system immediately through a lump-sum transfer from consumers to banks. If
the unbacked deposits Nt are eliminated from banks’ balance sheets, the government
recovers its ability to control inﬂation, as shown in Lemma 1. But if the recapitalization
of an insolvent banking system by injecting taxpayers’ money is politically diﬃcult or
13infeasible, as it was in Japan in the 1990s, the government has no other choice than to
set nominal interest rates at nearly zero and to let deﬂation occur.
The above arguments show that monetary policy (swaps between government bonds
and cash) alone is not eﬀective in halting deﬂation when ﬁscal policy has the constraint:




s=0 Rs)B0,w h e r eB0 is an appropriate positive constant. In this case, the
government can postpone bank recapitalization indeﬁnitely, and can keep the price level







Bt ≥ B0 > 0. Thus escaping from deﬂation without recapitalizing
insolvent banking system is infeasible for the government in the equilibrium.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I demonstrated that deﬂation can occur if the government undertakes
forbearance policy vis-` a-vis bank insolvency by guaranteeing deposits and postponing
bank recapitalization.
A forbearance policy turns nonperforming loans into de facto government debt.
Therefore, nonperforming loans have the same inﬂationary eﬀect on the economy as the
government debt, although this eﬀect is sealed until the time of bank recapitalization.
Until then banks are forced to hold deposit liabilities that correspond to the nonperform-
ing loans under the technological constraint that total deposit liabilities cannot exceed
a certain multiple of cash reserves. Since cash reserves become scarcer as nonperforming
loans grow, price level falls until the bank bailout. But at the time of the bailout, when
the scarcity of cash reserves diminishes abruptly, a big inﬂationary spurt occurs.
S i n c eIf o c u s e do nt h ec h a n g e si np r i c el e v e li nt h i sp a p e r ,Is i m p l i ﬁed the production
technology in a way that resulted in no welfare loss. But it should be easy to generalize
this model so as to incorporate a distortionary tax system and capital accumulation.
If that were done, surely the forbearance on bank insolvency would generate a welfare
loss, just like in Dekle and Kletzer (2003), Barseghyan (2002), and Kobayashi (2003), in
addition to deﬂation and a fall in nominal interest rates.
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